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policy can no longer afford to focus
solely on defending the supply of oil. As
time goes by, less oil will remain outside OPEC countries; proportionally
more will be in areas where its extraction is more difficult and costly. Over
time, this trend will make access problematic and uncertain. Lastly, energy is
political. Because energy is centrally
connected to everything else of importance, overhauling the current system
is going to be one of the most politically difficult challenges facing the
world in the twenty-first century. This
process will entail considerable political
and economic risk.
Overall, Roberts’s coverage is balanced,
providing significant insights into all
aspects of the energy economy. One of
the strengths of The End of Oil is that it
offers the big picture without bogging
down the reader in endless technical
details or facts. Another of its strengths
is that although the author is somewhat
pessimistic about the world’s ability to
transition effectively and peacefully to
the next energy economy, he is able to be
optimistic as well.
In summary, The End of Oil is an effective argument for the need to take a
proactive role in building America’s energy future. We can either construct the
kind of energy future we desire or wait
and hope that the transition to the next
energy economy will work out on its
own. Hope, as any good strategist will
tell you, is not a strategy. The End of Oil
is therefore a must read for strategists,
political and business leaders, and anyone interested in America’s future.
ALAN BOYER

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Fukuyama, Francis. State Building: Governance
and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2004. 132pp. $21

This is an important policy analysis.
Francis Fukuyama, an expert on political and economic development, has
served on the State Department’s policy
planning staff and is now professor of
international political economy at
Johns Hopkins University.
In his book State Building, Fukuyama
argues here that the international community must do a better job of “statebuilding . . . because weak or failed
states are the sources of many of the
world’s most serious problems.” We
know a lot about public administration,
he says, but much less about how to
“transfer strong institutions to developing countries.”
Fukuyama coins the term “stateness,”
referring to a regime’s ability to perform. He distinguishes two dimensions
of stateness: state strength, which denotes that a government can “enforce
laws cleanly and transparently,” and
state scope, which embraces the range of
the functions that a government tries to
accomplish.
To understand what Fukuyama means
by scope, imagine a government that
seeks only to maintain public order, enforce contracts, provide national defense, and manage its money supply.
Fukuyama would describe that state as
having modest scope. Next, imagine a
government that, in addition to what
was just mentioned, owns and runs
steel mills and hospitals, tries to provide free education through the university level, and promises its people
pensions. Such a government would
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have considerable scope. However,
whether it could carry out any or all of
these functions well is an entirely separate matter of state strength.
What do poor countries need to develop economically? According to
Fukuyama, “conventional wisdom’s”
answer to this question has changed in
recent years. During the Ronald Reagan
and the Margaret Thatcher years, development experts focused on state scope,
arguing that less-developed countries
(LDCs) needed smaller governments;
accordingly, they urged states to discontinue activities that other parties
could handle better. Unfortunately,
they did not recognize the importance
of institutions like courts that work and
legal regimes that defend property
rights. As a result, international bodies
like the World Bank demanded that
states get smaller without distinguishing between scope (which should have
been reduced) and strength (which
should have been enhanced).
Fukuyama lists the causes for LDC state
weakness. Sometimes local elites benefit
from the status quo, which in many instances is, for them, a life-or-death issue. In other cases, society may not
understand how much better off it
would be given better institutions—
foreign donors’ efforts to develop
stronger state institutions via “conditionality” often fail. (Donors find it
hard to show “tough love” by cutting
off states that fail to meet their conditions. Even if one does so, moreover,
often another steps in.) In addition, donors often give higher priority to firstrate service delivery than to building
the capacity of the LDC’s fledgling
state bureaucracy. So they hire away
the best locals, often leaving the LDC
even weaker.
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The book examines the “international
dimension of state weakness,” stating
that instability is in fact driven by state
weakness. Since the Berlin Wall came
down, the author notes, most international crises have had to do with weak
or failing states. Sovereignty has been
eroded because of this weakness. No
one, says Fukuyama, in the international community believes in a “pure”
sovereignty any more. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s eroded
what force that idea may once have had.
What should national security professionals learn from Fukuyama’s argument?
Here are three lessons. First, do not assume that postwar stabilization operations always involve state building. For
example, some people have expressed optimism about U.S. chances for making
Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies,
on grounds that the United States defeated tyrannical regimes in Germany and
Japan and successfully made democracies
of them. Fukuyama points out that those
latter occupations did not involve state
building. Germany and Japan were hard
to beat because they were already strong
states. U.S. victory and occupation
changed those states’ bases of legitimacy;
doing so was easier than creating a strong
state from a weak one. Second, the United
States should have modest expectations
for building democratic states and growing economies in countries with weak
states. The United States has “intervened
and/or acted as an occupation authority
. . . [and] . . . pursued . . . nation-building
activities in . . . Cuba, the Philippines,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and
South Vietnam.” Despite U.S. efforts,
“South Korea was the only country to
achieve long-term economic growth.”
Third, given America’s poor track record
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at creating strong states via occupation, it
should be thinking about fall-back positions if it fails at creating democracy
overseas.
The United States needs to get better at
state building. The U.S. military cannot
avoid bearing much of the implied burden, like it or not. Read State Building
for a thoughtful introduction to the
challenges involved.
MARSHALL HOYLER

Naval War College

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. 695pp. $29.95

The events of 9/11 led many in the
United States to wonder what had actually led up to that fateful day. Who was
to blame? How could the United States,
with its multibillion-dollar intelligence
and defense budgets, have allowed such
a thing to happen? In Ghost Wars, Steve
Coll provides a useful, if overly long,
chronology and analysis of pivotal
events, missteps, indecision, apathy,
and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks.
Coll, who served as the managing editor
for the Washington Post until 2004, was
the paper’s South Asia bureau chief
from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer
Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South
Asia, and he has been a keen observer of
events in the region. He begins his story
with the burning of the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979
and traces the long road of events to 11
September. It was shortly after the riots
in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, in December 1979.
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As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticulously documents every player and
agenda in this drama. Coll divides the
book into three parts. In the first he
discusses the Soviet occupation from
December 1979 to February 1989. It is
here that we are introduced to mujahedeen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
and Osama Bin Laden. One also becomes acquainted with key players in
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi
monarchy who played key roles in
bankrolling the resistance. The author
also provides valuable insights into the
U.S. policy-making process. During this
period, the United States was consumed
with battling the Soviet occupation, and
most policy makers did not give serious
thought to the repercussions of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate’s
growing control over aid distribution or
the increasing anti-American attitudes of
such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.
Coll continues to trace events in Afghanistan after the Soviet pullout in
1989. Once the Soviets were gone, interest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly
waned as other crises in the immediate
post–Cold War era monopolized U.S.
attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell
into chaos as warlords fought each other
for control of Kabul. The lack of American involvement after the Soviets withdrew left Pakistan as the primary force to
manage the post-Soviet environment.
The author captures the rivalries within
Afghanistan, the manipulation of events
by the Pakistani government, and the
apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout
this period.
One of the major strengths of Ghost
Wars is how it skillfully captures the interagency debates within the U.S.
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